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ABSTRACT 
 
Online auctions have emerged as a major opportunity for individuals to start businesses or for 
established businesses to diversify and grow their markets. To-date, research interest has focused 
largely on the technological entrepreneur rather than the Internet based (cyber) entrepreneur. The aim 
of this study was to examine the behaviour of participants in online auctions. Response to changed 
independent variables under actual market conditions was measured. In order to test the study’s 
hypotheses, a one way ANOVA was initially undertaken to separately examine differences in the % of 
Recommended retail price (RRP) for each of the study’s three independent variables – postage, starting 
price and length of auction.  Following this initial analysis, a factorial ANOVA was undertaken to 
assess the interactive effects of the three independent variables on the % of RRP obtained by the seller.  
Finally, an OLS regression analysis was undertaken to assess the effects of selling strategies on the % 
of RRP obtained.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Online auctions have emerged as a major opportunity for individuals to start businesses or for 
established businesses to diversify and grow their markets. To-date, research interest has focused 
largely on the technological entrepreneur rather than the Internet based (cyber) entrepreneur. The aim 
of this study was to examine the significance of reference pricing in online auctions using quantitative 
and qualitative analysis. How do participants behave in online auctions?  
 
In what has been termed the ‘Experience Economy’, retailers are redefining themselves as a source of 
memories rather than a provider of goods (Pine & Gilmore, 1999). Despite the broad concept that the 
value that motivates consumption is attributed to many non-empirical aspects of utility, empirical 
researchers see value more narrowly as a trade-off between price and value (Dodds, Monroe & Grewal, 
1991)or the effect of context on choice (Simonson & Tversky, 1992) The effect of retail experience on 
consumer mood, attitude and behaviour has been well researched (Turley & Milliman, 2000). In recent 
times however the retail experience has undergone major changes, as digital multichannel retail 
channels have developed. Some researchers contend that online shoppers emphasise cost reduction 
over brand-based differentiation (Mathwick, Malhotra & Rigdon, 2001; Pine, Gilmore, 1999) and that 
Internet shopping may be leading to widespread commoditisation of products. 
 
Online auctions add yet another dimension to the online retail experience. There is some evidence of  
the herd behavious bias – a tendency to gravitate toward, and bid for auction listings with one or more 
existing bids, and the bias increases with the difficulty of evaluating quality (Dholakia & Soltysinski, 
2001). Simonson and Tversky (1992) proposed that the tendency to prefer an alternative is enhanced or 
hindered by the nature of tradeoffs (favourable or unfavourable) or by extremeness aversion – a 
preference for a middle option. Kahneman, Wakker & Sarin (1997) proposed a formative theory of the 
total experienced utility of temporally extended outcomes permitting tests of utility maximisation, 
allowing other lines of empirical research to be opened. In contrast to decision utility which is inferred 
from user’s choices, there may be an opportunity to consider online auction buying decisions in terms 
of experienced utility in conjunction with the collection of empirical data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The traditional English auction system is open-cry, single item, last price with no seller reserve. Online 
auctions have created a unique set of conditions that are not replicated in previous auction theory (Dans, 
2002). The movement of the five basic auction mechanisms defined by Vickrey (1961)  – English, 
Dutch, First, Second and Double Auctions  – to the Web, have involved changes in the way auctions 
are conducted, and sometimes also in the underlying concepts. 
The public nature of online auctions has encouraged empirical researchers to gather and analyse data 
from auctions but to date the focus has been on aspects of buyer behaviour rather than seller outcomes. 
There has been extensive research on classical auction theory (Klemperer 2002; Milgrom & Weber, 
1982) but this theory may not be directly transferred to the online auction context (Lucking-Reiley, 
1999). Reasons offered for this include anonymity of internet, longer duration, bid sniping ((Shmueli & 
Jank, 2005). 
 
It is fair to assume that online markets will react to quality uncertainly (Akerlof,1970) in the same way 
as off line markets; but how will this uncertainty manifest itself for the sale of new goods, of known 
quality, but unknown value?  
Dholakia and Simonson (2005) suggest that explicit reference points (1) diminished the influence of 
adjacent auction prices on the focal auction’s price; (2) led participants to submit fewer, lower, and 
later bids; (3) increased the incidence of sniping; (4) decreased bidding frenzy; and (5) decreased the 
tendency to bid on multiple items simultaneously.  
 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
In recent years as online auctions have become popular, an increasing body of scholarly work has 
focused on aspects of online consumer behaviour. To date, most of this work has focused on issues of 
trust, bidding behaviour, and metrics associated with traffic. Consumer behaviour as it relates to end 
price in online auctions has largely been ignored. This has led to uncertainty for sellers, in deciding the 
best strategies to optimised final price and net returns. A study of these uncertainties will lead to better 
decision making clarity for sellers, in turn reducing uncertainty and risk associated with online auction 
selling. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of the study was to determine if there was an association between start price, reference 
price and seller profit margin. Previous studies have focused on bidding behaviour in terms of page hits, 
number of bids and number of participants as measures of auction activity, but these measures may 
have a poor relationship to final sale price and overall profitability for the seller (Bajari, Hortacsu 2003, 
Bapna, Goes & Gupta 2003; Dholakia & Simonson 2005; Lucking-Reiley et al., 1999; Monsuwé, 
Dellaert & Ruyter, 2004). This research contributes to the existing literature by analysing the 
relationship between start price, reference price, auction duration and distribution cost and the effects 
of the mix of these variables on final price. Strategies are suggested to optimise the ability of auction 
sellers to maximise average profit margin, from multiple auctions.  
Using a behavioural approach, this study identifies and delineates components of experiential 
knowledge in the auction process. Considerable theoretical justification for consumers' use of 
psychological reference points exists from the research literature. (Kalyanaram & Winer 1995). From a 
seller’s perspective, one of the most important applications of this concept is reference price, an 
internal standard against which observed prices are compared.  
 
Adaptation-level theory (Helson, 1964) suggests that people adapt to the level of stimuli and judge new 
stimuli in comparison with the adaptation level. External stimuli could be the start price in an online 
auction, or a recommended retail price included in the listing. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) suggests differing results based on comparisons made. Potential losses compared to a reference 
point may have more (negative) influence than possible gains of a similar amount.  
 
The movement of the five basic auction mechanisms to an online auction environment (Vickrey, 1961) 
– English, Dutch, First, Second and Double – has changed both the way auctions are conducted, and 
some of the underlying concepts as new mechanisms emerge (Dans, 2002). One aspect of buyer 
behaviour that is still not clear, is the effect of reference price on profit margin in an online auction. 
Unlike a physical auction, where competing bidders are declared (by observation and declaration), 
bidders in an online auction may remain hidden until the last few seconds on the auction. Second-price 
auction formats (where the winning bidder pays the price of the second highest bid), usually 
incorporate proxy bidding a feature offered by many online auctions, which may further impact on 
traditional bidding behaviour. This is the case with eBay, the most popular consumer to consumer 
auction site. 
 
What then would be the impact of explicit comparisons of risk-averse behaviour? The primary research 
question addressed by the study was:  
 
What is the relationship between the starting bid, reference price and seller gross margin in an online 
auction? 
 
Three hypotheses were developed and tested. They centre on the lack of knowledge in the areas of 
reference pricing in online auctions, seller strategies and margin maximisation.  
 
Hypothesis 1.  
A lower opening bid will have a positive impact on the % of RRP received. 
 
Hypothesis 2.  
Free postage on selected items will be positively related to the % of RRP received. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
The time an auction runs will be positively related to the % of RRP received. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
With the cooperation of an existing online book seller, the study examined three main auction-start 
pricing strategies; fully priced (H), cost priced (M) and below cost priced (L). Auction duration and 
postage cost were also varied to compare the combined effects on buyer behaviour. An explanatory 
mixed method design (also known as exploratory sequential design) was used (Ivankova, Creswell & 
Stick, 2006).  
Empirical data was collected and analysed from a field experiment involving over 1,000 auctions. The 
data was analysed using SPSS, and further explained in terms of anecdotal opinions and evidence 
provided by online auction sellers. Subjective opinions of optimal selling strategies were gathered from 
online discussion boards, to allow comparisons to be made between auction user perceptions and 
measured auction outcomes. While the study primarily took an empirical approach, a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods were used as information asymmetries play an important role in 
online auctions for both buyers and sellers. 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
While some minor changes may be made to auction conditions during an auction, most auction 
characteristics must be set pre-auction. They include: 
 
• start price (High/medium/low) 
• duration (3/5/7/10 days) 
• information (text, photos, hyperlinks) 
• postage (High/free) 
• auction close time (constant evening) 
 
The most influence can be exerted on the list price, duration and postage cost. Because eBay is 
currently the most significant auction host in Australia it has been chosen to host the auctions. Batches 
of 50 books at a time were sold over a twelve month period. The close time was constant (evening), 
listing information and photos were also constant, and no reserves were set (other than a visible start 
price). Auction start price, duration and postage cost were all varied. Start price was set at high or low 
level (free); auction duration was 3/5/7 or 10 days; postage was set to ‘high’ (A$8 per item) or free. 
The auction design is shown in Table 1. To achieve these different combinations, a total of 1,000 
auctions were conducted. The auction mix was randomised weekly to prevent potential buyers from 
tracking listing patterns (such as low price/no post). 
 
 
Table 1 
1000 Auctions comprising 30+ titles (BT) x 3 (SP) x 4 (D) x 2 (P)  
Book title (BT) Start price (SP) Duration (D) Postage (P) 
30+ Titles H, M, L 3, 5, 7, 10 days High or 
Free 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
In order to test the study’s hypotheses, a one way ANOVA was initially undertaken to separately 
examine differences in the % of RRP for each of the study’s three independent variables – postage, 
starting price and length of auction.  Following this initial analysis, a factorial ANOVA was undertaken 
to assess the interactive effects of the three independent variables on the % of RRP obtained by the 
seller.  Finally, an OLS regression analysis was undertaken to assess the effects of selling strategies on 
the % of RRP obtained.  
 
H1 - A lower starting price will have a positive impact on the % of RRP obtained 
As indicated by Table 2, the results indicate a significant relationship between the starting price level 
and the % of RRP obtained from the auction (F(2,527) = 111.89, p<0.01).  In order to determine the 
degree of difference between the mean % of RRP obtained for each particular starting price, a post-hoc 
Tukey HSD test was undertaken.  The mean % of RRP obtained from the high start price was 115.95%, 
which was significantly higher (p<0.01) than that achieved from either a medium (88.11%) or low 
(56.34%) starting price.  Furthermore, a significantly higher (p<0.01) % of RRP was obtained when a 
medium, rather than a low, starting price strategy was adopted.  These findings contradict the notion 
that a lower starting price constitutes an optimal selling strategy.  In contrast, a high starting price 
provided the greatest return.  
 
 
Table 2 - Relationship between starting price and % of RRP obtained 
Starting price N % of RRP 
(Mean) 
Std. 
Deviation 
High 152 115.95 31.24 
Medium 162 88.11 30.04 
Low 216 56.34 46.64 
F(2,527) = 111.89, p < 0.01 
 
 
H2 - Free postage on selected items will be positively related to the % of RRP obtained 
Hypothesis 2 was examined by comparing the mean % of RRP when postage was included in the 
auction bid (i.e. low) to the mean % of RRP when postage was an additional charge (i.e. high).  As 
indicated by Table 3, the % of RRP was significantly higher (F(1,528) = 13.66, p < 0.01) when postage 
was free/low (90.41%) than when an additional postage charge was applicable (76.05%).  This finding 
supports H2, however, as discussed later, sellers need to be aware of the interaction between starting 
price and postage, when determining the most optimal selling strategy.  Another important 
consideration for sellers is to assess if the greater % of RRP obtained through a low postage strategy is 
sufficient to provide a greater return when postage costs are taken into consideration. 
Table 3 - Relationship between postage level and % of RRP obtained 
Postage level N % of RRP 
(Mean) 
Std. 
Deviation 
High 268 76.05 43.75 
Low 262 90.41 45.68 
F(1,528) = 13.66, p < 0.01 
 
 
H3 - The time an auction runs will be positively related to the % of RRP obtained 
The analysis of variance identified a significant association between the length of an auction and the % 
of RRP obtained (F(3,526) = 7.80, p < 0.01).  The difference between the % of RRP obtained from a 5, 
7 or 10 day auction were, however, not significant (p>0.60).  The major discrepancy regarding the 
relationship between the length of auction and % of RRP obtained concerned the lower returns 
experienced from 3 day auctions as shown in Table 4.  The average 3 day auction % of RRP was 
significantly lower than that obtained from the 5 day (p<0.01), 7 day (p<0.01) and 10 day (p<0.01) 
auctions.   This finding supports H3, to the extent that longer auctions (i.e. 5 day, 7 day and 10 day) 
provide a higher % of RRP.  The study’s findings do not provide any evidence to support the concept 
that increasing the length of an auction to more than 5 days will positively influence the % of RRP 
obtained.  
 
 
Table 4 - Relationship between length of auction and % of RRP obtained 
Days of 
auction 
N % of RRP 
(Mean) 
Std. 
Deviation 
3 71 60.22 42.02 
5 74 86.35 41.56 
7 152 90.23 39.43 
10 233 84.50 48.80 
F(3,526) = 7.80, p < 0.01 
 
 
Interactions 
Although the above analysis investigated the main effects of each independent variable on the % of 
RRP obtained, a factorial ANOVA was also undertaken to examine the influence of interactions 
between starting price, postage level and days of auction.  This analysis found that the interaction 
between starting price & days (F=0.90, p=0.49), days & postage (F=2.38, p=0.65) and starting price, 
days and postage (F=.70, p=0.63) did not significantly influence the % of RRP obtained.  However, the 
interaction between starting price & postage was significant at the p<.10 level.  This finding suggests 
that the effect of postage on the % of RRP obtained depends on the level of starting price.  Further 
analysis of the simple effects between each starting price and level of postage then ensued.  As 
demonstrated by Figure 1, this process revealed that auctions with low starting prices and free postage 
obtained a significantly higher average % of RRP than auctions with a low start price and high postage 
(t(208.79) = -3.29, p < 0.01).  Simple effects at the other levels of starting price were not significant, 
indicating that for auctions with high and medium starting prices, the % of RRP obtained was similar 
even if the cost of postage was additional. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Interaction between starting price and postage level 
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Levene statistic = 5.55 (p<.05) 
 
 
Effects of selling strategies on % of RRP obtained 
OLS regression was conducted to assess the fit between the study’s implied model, that the % of RRP 
is influenced by starting price, postage levels and length of auction, and the data collected.  The 
dependent variable for the OLS regression was % of RRP, while dummy variables were developed for 
each of the independent variables - starting price, postage levels and length of auction.  The reference 
variables were low starting price, free (low) postage and 3 day auctions. 
 
Figure 2 indicates that the combination of the three independent variables significantly predicted the % 
of RRP obtained from the study’s auctions (F(6,523) = 43.61, p<0.01).  The adjusted R2 using all the 
predictors simultaneously is .33, meaning that 33% of the variance in the % of RRP obtained can be 
attributed to the explanatory variables - starting price, postage level and length of auction.  All 
predictors significantly influenced the % of RRP obtained, although the analysis indicates that the high 
(t=14.46, p<.01) and medium (t=7.62, p<.01) starting price levels have the greatest influence.   
 
In terms of selling strategies, the coefficient weights, presented in figure 2, indicate that when 
compared to a low starting price (the reference variable), a medium starting price will result in a 30.2% 
increase and a high start price a 57.8% increase in the % of RRP obtained.  The influence of providing 
an additional charge for postage resulted in an 11.7% decrease in the % of RRP than what would be 
obtained if postage were free.  Finally, the analysis identified that a 5 day (18.2% increase in % of 
RRP), 7 day (15.5%) or 10 day (17.3%) auction will provide a more favourable result for the seller than 
a shorter 3 day auction.  
 
Figure 2 – OLS regression analysis: effects of selling strategies on % of RRP obtained 
 
*p<.01 
F(6,523) = 43.61, p<0.01 
Adjusted R2 = .33 
Note: Unstandardised regression coefficients provided (B0=48.68) 
 
ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE 
 
eBay Powerseller (sellers with sales > $2,000/month) discussion boards were monitored over a 12 
month period to gauge seller attitudes to optimal start price, auction length and postage rates. The first 
comment is included from the eBay basics selling page. All remaining comments were collected from 
the Powersellers discussion boards. A wide range of opinions are proffered with the following cross 
section offered by way of example - 
 
On Start Price –  
Lower start prices can generate higher demand by stimulating interest. List at $0.99c or under & you 
can take advantage of the lower listing fee (only $0.30c). 
(http://pages.ebay.com.au/education/learn-to-sell-basics-listing-example.html) 
 
 
“eBay encourages sellers to start low espousing the theory that you get more bidders that way and 
create excitement (to paraphrase). For 1 off products or collectables I can see that might work, but I 
don’t think it works in crowded categories, which many are.” 
 
“I get to the point where I’m sick of being a storage facility and just want to move my stock.” 
 
“The cheaper sellers are, the buyer is more likely to think products are poor quality.” 
 
“It strikes me that many sellers are committing commercial suicide on eBay. I mean why bother going 
to the trouble of importing, listing, packing and shipping for zero profit?” 
 
“Hi folks. Have you been receiving emails from eBay saying They Want you to sell your items for 99 
cents…I’ve done this twice in the last week and came out very badly Financially. Is anyone else having 
this problem?” 
 
On auction length –  
“Went to an eBay seminar given by that AG fellow earlier this year, he claimed it didn’t make any 
difference whether you list for 3, 5, 7, or 10. What do you think?” 
 
“This has been discussed at length over the past year, and most have concluded that 7 day auctions are 
the best. If the item is rare/high priced then 10 days is best.” 
 
“I usually do 7 days unless I’ve been out of town and need to get auctions up, then I do 5 days, but they 
don’t usually go for as high a price.” 
 
“The shorter auctions (1, 3, 5 days) work better for items that you will make a good profit on at your 
start price, and things that sell quickly, and are in high demand.” 
 
On postage – 
“No people automatically think you’ve upped the prices in order to offer the free postage.” 
 
“I don’t find it to work on a regular basis. I think people like to see the true postage cost in black and 
white and then factor that into the sale price. Some people have paid for postage when I’ve offered free 
post with buy it now, then it is a hassle refunding.” 
 
“I offer $2 post on smaller items and it has definitely increased sales there.” 
 
“Why do people think these things actually get posted free of charge?” 
 
“So unless I can find a magical land where postage is free, I will expect people to pay!” 
 
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
The study was confined to speciality book sales. The choice of books to auction was opportunistic as 
they were provided by a willing business.  They were convenient, had a similar value and standard 
postage cost. Because books do not attract the high number of hits or bids that some other goods do 
(such as computer related goods) this may be considered a limitation. However, the very satisfactory 
preliminary analysis of the data will allow for the results to be a compared with future findings that are 
based on the use of different goods. 
 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The findings are useful because links between the auction start price, and the variables of auction 
duration and postage cost were clearly related to seller operating gross margin. In the increasingly 
competitive environment faced by today's online auction sellers, the pursuit of profit maximisation is 
paramount. In order to be competitive, sellers must identify the key elements of selling strategies whilst 
also building customer loyalty, satisfaction and trust. The findings of this study contribute to the 
development of an organizing framework for auction sales, which is exceptionally important for sellers.  
The study undertook an empirical examination of the effect of differing start prices on sale outcomes 
and identified new approaches not previously tested.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Even within disparate product categories the study found that optimal selling strategies are indicated. 
The mix of start price, auction duration and postage cost, effects product sale price in a manner that 
indicates the desirability of high start pricing. In the rapidly evolving online auction marketplace there 
is a need for ongoing evaluation of buyer preferences to aid seller pricing strategies. Contrary to the 
findings of earlier Internet auction studies that focused on cost reduction as primary buyer motivators, 
this study found that buyers are drawing on a wide range of experiential value sources. Average selling 
prices on auction sites may actually have increased, although it is acknowledged that some product 
category prices may have fallen due to over supply. The anecdotal evidence clearly demonstrates that 
there is contradictory information provided to sellers. Auction selling management will become 
increasingly important and further studies are indicated. 
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